

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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EB-11 NEA-10 ACDA-19 SAJ-01 OMB-01 NIC-01 DOTE-00

COME-00 DRC-01 DLOS-06 COA-02 FAA-00 EA-11 SCI-06

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P R 091446Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7934

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1018

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR NO UR

SUBJ: NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI'S VISIT TO USSR

BEGIN SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND BRIEFED ME ON MARCH 8 REGARDING PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI'S FORTHCOMING OFFICIAL VISIT (MAR 18-24) TO THE USSR. MOST OF THE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT DUE FOR SIGNATURE HAVE BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY. NEW WRINKLES INCLUDED THE FACT THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE SINGED BETWEEN NORWEGIAN STATE TELEVISION NRK AND PRESUMABLY MOSCOW TELEVISION, PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE THE VISIT; THAT FRYDENLUND FEELS UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO ACCEPT A SOVIET CONSULATE IN TROMSO; THAT
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BRATTELI NO LONGER FEELS ANY NEED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF SOVIET

JEWS OR DISSIDENTS SINCE HIS STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT IN PARLIAMENT; AND THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE SUGGESTED PRIVATELY THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING BILATERAL TALKS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBM). END SUMMARY.

1. FRYDENLUND EVIDENTLY INTENDED OUR MEETING TO REPRESENT CONSULTATION PRIOR TO HIS DISCUSSION OF THE UPCOMING VISIT ON MONDAY WITH AMBASSADOR ROMANOVSKIY. I CAME PREPARED TO DISCUSS SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE NORTH AND OUR OWN CONCERNS THERE AT SOME LENGTH, BUT MOST OF THE CONVERSATION REVOLVED AROUND THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS OR POSITIONS THAT NORWAY INTENDED TO TAKE IN THE UPCOMING TALKS.

2. REGARDING THE FOCUS OF THE VISIT, FRYDENLUND SAID HE EXPECTED THE USSR WOULD BE MOST CONCERNED WITH PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH, NOTABLY SVALBARD. WHILE NATO WILL NOT PLAY THE PROMINENT ROLE IT HAS IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, SOVIETS WILL SEEK SOME REASSURANCE THAT NORWEGIAN BASE POLICY HAS NOT BEEN MODIFIED. FRYDENLUND REFERRED IN THIS CONNECTION TO SPECULATION IN THE GERMAN AND NORWEGIAN PRESS THAT NORWAY MIGHT OFFER A BASE TO REPLACE KEFLAVIK. HE SAID THAT NORWAY WILL SEEK IN THE VISIT TO ACTIVATE COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

3. FRYDENLUND, SECONDED BY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE, OUTLINED NORWEGIAN THINKING REGARDING THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS. FRYDENLUND SAID HE PLANNED TO INFORM ROMANOVSKIY ON MONDAY THAT NORWAY IS NOT INTERESTED IN SIGNING ANY DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT; HE SAID A SIMILAR STANCE DURING PREPARATIONS FOR 1971 KOSYGIN VISIT WAS EFFECTIVE IN GETTING THE SOVIETS TO DROP THE QUESTION. FOR REASONS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR TO ME, FRYDENLUND SEEMED CONCERNED OVER THE REACTION IN NORWAY SHOULD HIS MINISTRY AGREE TO SOME SUCH DOCUMENT. VIBE IS APPARENTLY LESS SANGUINE THAT THE DELEGATION WILL HOLD THE LINE; HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAD SIGNED SUCH STATEMENTS AND COMMENTED THAT, IN CASE OF TURKEY, IT WAS COMPLETELY BLAND (AND BY IMPLICATION HARMLESS) DOCUMENT.

(B) CONSULAR CONVENTION AND TROMSO POST. FRYDENLUND NOTED THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE 1971 CONVENTION WOULD BE EXCHANGED DURING THE VISIT. HE ASKED WHAT THE REACTION OF THE USG WOULD BE TO HAVING THE USSR OPEN A CONSULAR POST IN TROMSO. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PRESSING NORWAY AND HE PERSONALLY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO TURN THE PROPOSAL DOWN GIVEN NORWAY'S EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN CLOSER COOPERATION. FRYDENLUND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VIBE DID NOT SHARE HIS VIEW. PROBING AGAIN FOR OUR REACTION, FRYDENLUND SAID HE MIGHT PROPOSE TO OPEN A CONSULATE IN MURMANSK IN EXCHANGE

FOR TROMSO; MURMANSK WOULD BE OF MORE INTEREST TO NORWAY THAN LENINGRAD, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY TURN DOWN THE OFFER, BUT IF THEY ACCEPTED, HE THOUGHT NORWAY HAD MORE TO GAIN THAN TO LOSE IN THE EXCHANGE. AFTER I HAD EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATIONS, FRYDENLUND COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY SHIFT TO THE "VIBE POSITION" AND TURN DOWN TROMSO AT HIS MONDAY MEETING WITH ROMANOVSKIY.

(C) ROAD TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT. NORWAY GAVE THE USSR A DRAFT AGREEMENT SOME TIME AGO. RECENTLY, ROMANOVSKIY REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOW PREPARED TO "LEAN ON" THE DEPARTMENT CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION IN MOSCOW AND OPEN NEGOTIATIONS. FRYDENLUND SAID HE EXPECTED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WOULD CONTAIN A REFERENCE TO THE OPENING OF TALKS.

(D) SHIPPING AGREEMENT. NORWAY APPARENTLY EXPECTS AN AGREEMENT TO BE READY FOR SIGNATURE IN MOSCOW, BUT IT IS STILL HELD UP BY NORWEGIAN INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING SOME REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF COMPETITION.

(E) SVALBARD. FRYDENLUND EXPECTS THAT THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION. HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THE RECENT THREE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING USE OF THE AIRPORT, LEGAL REGULATIONS ON SVALBARD, AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON SVALBARD AND ITS ADJACENT AREAS HAD COME OUT FAIRLY WELL. HE SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE VERY FIRM IN STATING THE NORWEGIAN POSITION, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE CAREFUL IN PUSHING THEIR DEMANDS FOR SPECIAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON SVALBARD. NORWAY PLANNED, FRYDENLUND SAID, TO TELL THE SOVIETS THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE 1920 TREATY IF IT CONSULTED WITH THEM AND TO NOTE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE TAKING A KEENER INTEREST IN THE AREA. FRYDENLUND DID NOT SEEM AS CONVINCED AS VIBE THAT THE BASIC SOVIET PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH A CONDOMINIUM WITH NORWAY OVER SVALBARD. FRYDENLUND SAID THAT HE WISHED TO COME BACK TO

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THIS QUESTION OF SVALBARD WITH ME LATER.

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USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 1018

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

(F) BARENTS SEA BOUNDARY. NORWAY HAS BEEN PRESSING THE USSR TO SETTLE THE BOUNDARY ISSUE, FEARING THAT THE LONGER THE ISSUE DRAGS ON, THE MORE RESTRICTIVE THE USSR WILL BECOME. VIBE SAID THAT NORWAY HAS PROPOSED THAT NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE THE LAST WEEK OF MAY, OR FIRST WEEK OF JUNE, OR IN SEPTEMBER. HE HOPED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WILL INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THESE TALKS, INCLUDING EVEN THE DATE.

(G) NRK-RADIO MOSCOW TV EXCHANGE. FRYDENLUND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, AND SAID THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE SIGNED EVEN BEFORE THE VISIT. OFFICIALS FROM NRK AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO WERE ASKED ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT TENDED CONFIDENTIAL

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TO MAKE LIGHT OF IT, CLAIMING THAT ITS PRINCIPAL PRACTICAL EFFECT WILL BE TO FACILITATE THE OPERATIONS OF PHOTOGRAPHERS AND REPORTERS IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRIES.

(H) SAS ROUTE TO CHINA. FRYDENLUND SAID THAT NORWAY WILL SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF SAS IN PRESSING FOR AN OVER-FLIGHT ROUTE TO CHINA. HE DID NOT APPEAR EITHER VERY INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OR HOPEFUL OF ANY RESULT.

(I) SOVIET DISSIDENTS. FRYDENLUND WAS AT SOME PAINS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT INTEND TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWRY, CHRISTIANS OR THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE USSR UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION IN PARLIAMENT, BRATTELI HAD FREED HIMSELF OF THE NECESSITY OF RAISING IT TO HIS SOVIET HOST DIRECTLY. SPEAKING WITH SOME EMOTION, FRYDENLUND SAID IT WAS BETTER NOT TO MAKE THE TRIP AT ALL RATHER THAN RAISE IT AND PROVOKE A "TERRIFIC REACTION". (COMMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER LAST YEAR AND THE SHARP REACTION WHEN BRATTELI RAISED THE QUESTION DURING KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO NORWAY HAD APPARENTLY IMPRESSED HIM.)

(J) NORTH STAR PROJECT. ASKED WHETHER HE ANTICIPATED THAT THIS QUESTION WOULD COME UP, FRYDENLUND SAID HE DOUBTED IT. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS INITIAL VIEWS AND NOW SAW SOME MERIT IN A PROJECT WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE US, USSR AND NORWAY IN A MUTUALLY COOPERATIVE SCHEME. HE ADDED THAT ROMANOVSKIY WAS SOMEWHAT LESS NEGATIVE THAN THE AMERICANS IN HIS EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PROJECT WOULD BE REALISED.

(K) PEACE ZONE AND CBMS. ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD HINTED AT ANY "ZONE OF PEACE" PROPOSAL EXCLUDING "FOREIGN" MILITARY VESSELS FROM THE BARENTS SEA, FRYDENLUND SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT A CAMPAIGN WAS UNDERWAY THROUGHOUT SCANDINAVIA IN LEFTIST CIRCLES TO MAKE THE NORTH ATLANTIC A ZONE OF PEACE. (HE SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT MOSCOW WOULD OPPOSE ANY SUCH PROPOSAL). THIS DISCUSSION PROMPTED VIBE TO REPORT THAT ON TWO OCCASIONS, THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S MOST EFFECTIVE CONTACT MAN, MAKAROV, HAS HINTED AT THE DESIRABILITY OF BILATERAL TALKS TO DISCUSS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE NORTH: VIBE ADDED THAT A SIMILAR HINT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH AT THE CSCE TALKS. VIBE WAS QUICK TO SAY NORWAY HAD NO INTENTION OF CONFIDENTIAL

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FALLING INTO THIS BILATERAL-NEGOTIATION TRAP.

(L) COMMUNIQUE. VIBE SAID HE EXPECTED SOVIETS WOULD PUSH HARD TO HAVE SOME REFERENCE TO THIRD STAGE OF CSCE BEING AT SUMMIT LEVEL. TEXT OF NORWEGIAN DRAFT WILL BE GIVEN SOVIETS MARCH 12.

4. VIBE EXPLAINED LATER TO DCM THAT FRYDENLUND WOULD NOT BE MEMBER OF DELEGATION SINCE TRADITIONALLY PRIME MINISTER AND FORMIN (WHO IS ALSO ACTING P.M. IN HIS ABSENCE) ARE NOT ON SAME DELEGATION. WHILE FRYDENLUND WAS PERSONALLY ANXIOUS TO GO, IT WAS FELT IT WOULD GIVE UNDUE IMPORTANCE TO THIS VISIT. OTHER MEMBERS OF DELEGATION INCLUDE EDUCATION MINISTER GJERDE (ONE OF RUMORED SUCCESSORS TO BRATTELI), UNDER SECRETARY IN BRATTELI'S OFFICE, KJELL KRISTENSEN, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BUE BRUN, AND CHIEF OF USSR

AND EE(4TH) DIVISION DAGFINN STENSETH.
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Message Attributes

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